The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

The Battle of Savo Island

Episode Summary

This week, Seth and Bill discuss the details of the worst defeat in the storied history of the United States Navy-The Battle of Savo Island. The team breaks down the minute details and the loss of 4 Allied heavy cruisers in the first surface engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign.

Episode Notes

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrine

• US Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy’s battleship, battle line.  
• While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor’s heads. 
• For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941.

• The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance.  Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that’s what they were supposed to do.

• The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting.     
• Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.
• While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.
• Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.
• Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN.       
• It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.
• The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII.  During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully.
•  

Advances in weaponry and technology

• Due to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.
• The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30’s
• Nearly wakeless
• Oxygen fueled
• 1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knots
• Superior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiority
• The USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks.

The Japanese respond to the American landings

• The first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7.

• His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.
• Mikawa’s orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.
• By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa’s force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for Guadalcanal
• He launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the area
• One of Aoba’s scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:
• 4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point
• 2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off Tulagi
• With this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strength
• Mikawa’s plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards

Allied preparation

• American air searches located Mikawa’s force as it was moving south
• First found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID’d as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading west
• Seen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SE
• US Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degrees
• S-38’s report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.
• Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th  as they slipped through the aerial net.
• Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to comply
• Sighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa’s force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack.  
• The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.
• Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass.

• British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense.  
• He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in at night.
• The southern group consisted of the CAs Australia, Canberra, and Chicago along with DDs Bagley and Patterson
• The northern group consisted of CAs Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria with DDs Helm and Wilson.
• A picket line consisting of 2 DDs, Talbot and Blue were to utilize radar to detect any incoming ships

• Crutchley’s plan for defense had several gaping holes, including a lack of clear orders for a night time defense and an assumption that everybody knew what everyone else was doing, when in fact, no one did.

• Also, there were no flag officers aboard any of the US ships in the northern group
• A Captain can’t fight his ship and command a TF at the same time…

The battle begins (South of Savo)

• At 2312 Mikawa sent cruiser search planes aloft to illuminate the shipping with flares.
• Float planes reported 3 CAs off Savo
• 2400 Mikawa formed his ships and increased speed to 26 knots
• At 0050 Savo was sighted and 3 minutes later Mikawa’s lookouts sighted the picket DD Blue and evaded her
• Mikawa’s entire force slipped past the picket DDs without being seen 
• Lookouts aboard the CA Chokai sighted 3 CAs off the starboard bow
• Mikawa ordered his ships to “independently fire”
• At 0138 4 long lances were launched at the same time lookouts spotted Vincennes visually at a range of 18,000 yards
• At 0143Chokai opened fire with her main battery on the HMAS Canberra
• Shortly before Chokai opened fire, Canberra’s lookouts spotted the enemy at 4500 yards dead ahead
• Canberra was put into a turn as to allow her main battery to fire, but before her main battery was even manned, she was hit by over 24 8 inch shells fired from 4 Japanese heavy cruisers.
• By 0150 Canberra slowed to a stop and was burning amidships

• Aboard USS Chicago, flashes were seen as torpedoes were launched as well as aircraft flares and Canberra swinging out of line to presumably open fire
• Astoundingly, none of this was put together as an enemy threat
• Chicago’s CO Bode reached the bridge shortly before his ship was struck by a torpedo.
• Seemingly blind to the gunfire erupting around him, Bode could not find anything to shoot at initially
• Her secondary battery opened fire and hit at least one ship, Tenryu
• Bode immediately withdrew westwards, leaving the transports he was assigned to protect wide open to any enemy attack.
• Worse yet, he neglected to report his contact with the enemy
• This is inexcusable and without doubt, caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans and resulted in the sinking of another 3 CAs

• The one bright spot, if there is one here, is that the DD Patterson, whose skipper, CDR Frank Walker was keenly aware of Japanese ships in the area, fought like a lion.
• Patterson tried to warn Canberra and Chicago of the Japanese ships by blinker light but it apparently went unseen
• Walker himself issued warnings over TBS but they were either ignored or unheard
• Patterson engaged in a gun duel with Tenryu and Yubari, illuminating them and zig zagging to avoid their fire.
• Patterson took a hit that disabled her after 5 inch guns, but returned to the fight hitting a Japanese CA.  
• Finally receiving orders to withdraw and cover the transports, only then did Patterson give up the fight

The Northern debacle

• Mikawa turns north and heads for the northern group of heavy cruisers after destroying the southern group in a span of 7 minutes
• Astonishingly, the Northern group STILL does not know that the enemy is closing

• USS Vincennes under the command of CAPT Riefkohl is leading the group
• Riefkohl has his ship at condition 2, not GQ, he himself is asleep as are all of the CAPT aboard the CAs
• Riefkohl supposedly believed that the Japanese would attack that night but failed to share his thoughts with the other CAPTs.  
• As CO of the Northern Group, he is at fault for this lack of preparedness

• At 0144, watches aboard all CAs felt underwater explosions (Japanese torpedoes exploding on Southern Group), but assumed them to be anti-sub ops
• At 0145 watches saw gunfire and flares from the south but failed to put two and two together

• Riefkohl is summoned to the bridge but due to rain and mist, could not see the southern group or what was happening
• No contact reports were given to him
• At 0150 searchlights illuminated his 3 CAs
• He thought this was the southern group and did nothing to counter
• At 0151 the Japanese opened fire on Astoria, followed by Vincennes and Quincy, which was the first ship hit.    

• Aboard Astoria, the ship was not at GQ, but the gunnery officer, after having witnessed shell fire and flashes, ordered the main battery to commence firing.
• CAPT Greenman arrived on the bridge, ordered cease fire and then resumed fire.  Astoria was quickly hit in the hangar and the fire that started made her a beacon for Japanese gunfire
• For ten (ish) minutes, Astoria was the focus of Aoba, Kinugasa, and Chokai’s main battery
• Most of Asty’s guns were disabled, her comms was wiped out and fires were all over the ship
• Asty fired one last salvo that knocked out Chokai’s forward main battery turret
• Astoria then she slid to a halt afire from stem to stern

• Aboard Quincy fires were seen to the south, gunfire was heard and her radr picked up Japanese ships.  CAPT Moore ordered the main battery to open fire, but they were not ready
• Hit by several shells, Quincy was afire due to her SOC airplanes and avgas in her hangar.
• As a result, she was bracketed and caught in a crossfire and veered out of line
• At 0204 she was hit by 2 torpedoes on the port side
• At 0216, with her CAPT dead and most of her bridge crew dead, she was hit by another torpedo and began to sink

• Aboard Vincennes, Riefkohl, now finally alert to the situation, ordered open fire, but his ship was hit in the hangar, and it too like her sisters served as a flaming beacon for Japanese gunners
• Vincennes was hit by a torpedo, then another and a third, killing everyone in the #1 fireroom and opening the ship’s bottom up

The battle ends

• By 0216 Mikawa’s victory was complete, and fear of American airpower caused Mikawa to turn tail and leave the area without engaging (and destroying) the transports nearby

• ADM Turner stopped unloading the transports at 0145, but stayed another day (WITHOUT AIR COVER) to finish what he could before he had to withdraw the transports

• Turner requested air cover from Fletcher who was still running away at 0641 and received his answer in a roundabout way when he intercepted a message from Fletcher to Ghormley essentially saying that Fletcher was out and Turner was now the force commander around GCanal.
• Pitiful
  
   
• Mikawa had utterly destroyed the Allied fleet in a stunning and aggressive action
• His victory was flawed in that had he attacked and sank the transports, which he easily could have, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been OVER right then.
• What could have been…

• 1,077 Allied sailors were killed, a further 700 were wounded with the loss of 4 heavy cruisers
• Japanese casualties were 129 killed, and 85 wounded, no sinkings
  
   
• The US concealed the defeat from the public until October

Implications on the campign…