The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

The Battle of Santa Cruz with special guest Jon Parshall

Episode Summary

This week Seth and Bill sit down with good buddy and friend of the show, Jon Parshall, to discuss the pivotal Battle of Santa Cruz that occurred in the waters near Guadalcanal on October 26, 1942. Tune in to hear what the trio has to say about the epic, and last, carrier duel of 1942.

Episode Notes

This week Bill and I have a special guest with us, he’s been here before and we always love to have him, he’s the one, the only, my good buddy, Jon Parshall.

If you’ve been listening to the podcast as of late, you are well aware that we are making our way through the slug fest that was the Guadalcanal campaign.  While the fighting ashore has raged on and off between pitched engagements, the seas around the Canal have been anything but quiet.  Savo Island in August was a debacle for the US Navy, the carrier forces under Admiral fletcher landed some fairly significant blows on the Japanese carrier force at Eastern Solomons, and Admiral Norman Scott finally exacted some revenge for Savo at the Battle of Cape Esperance.  The US Navy has seen it’s share of victories, as well as defeats in these bloody waters.  And while the fighting has been significant at sea…it ain’t over.  Not even close.  

The calendar now sits in October 1942, October 26 exactly.  And ashore, the Japanese have launched a massive offensive to finally push the Marines and Army off Guadalcanal.  The October offensive and the fighting that takes place ashore will be remembered as the Battle of Henderson Field.  The fighting at sea that takes place only a day later, all coinciding with the offensive ashore, will be called the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Talking Points:

Japanese Preparations and Plans Pre-Battle:

• The combined fleet sorties from Truk on October 11.  The force is very large, the largest Japanese force that has put to sea since Midway and consists of 4 CVs and 1 light CV
• 3 Fleet CVs
• 1 Light CV
• 4 BBs
• 8 CAs
• 2 CLs
• 24 DDs
• The Japanese had planned that the naval force that was now at sea would not necessarily support the operation ashore, but would directly benefit from the success of the ground offensive
• That being said, once Hyakutake’s infantry had captured Henderson, the Japanese combined fleet would then be free from any attack from land based air.
• The pre-sailing plans called for the Japanese so-called Support Force to make a high-speed run into the Guadalcanal area to intercept and destroy any American fleet units that would come to the rescue of the infantry following the Japanese land-based offensive’s success.
• This is part of the reason why Kongo and Haruna blasted the shit out of Henderson on October 14-15.  Both to soften the defenses, destroy the airfield and also, hopefully draw the Americans out to fight.
• Japanese intel, which we have not talked about very much, had deduced via traffic patterns that at least 1 US CV was in the Canal area.
• Based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had seen a large flurry of messages go out to a “powerful unit” south of Guadalcanal that would receive the messages and maintain radio silence.
• This of course is CV8
• Again, based on traffic patterns, the Japanese had deduced that another major fleet unit had sailed from Pearl Harbor on or about Oct 15.
• This is the newly repaired CV6
• The Japanese estimated that this task force was headed south as well to join up with the other “ghost” force
• Japanese. Intel also read US newspapers and listened to the news, as US officials ignorantly declared on October 20 that US Naval forces off Guadalcanal were preparing for a “sea clash”

The Land influences the Sea

• Delays ashore from the Japanese 17th Army (future Henderson Field offensive force) caused Y-Day to be pushed from October 19 to the 22nd.  
• Incidentally, Hiyo suffers a fire in her engineering spaces that causes her to return to port and not take part in the planned upcoming action.
• 17th Army again delays the offensive until the 24th further irritating the IJN.
• The delay by the Army forced the Navy to delay its attack which allowed CV6 to rejoin the American forces off Guadalcanal on October 24 and thus restoring some parity to any upcoming carrier battle.

US Forces for battle

• US forces are under the overall command of ADM Thomas Kinkaid 
• TF 16 under Kinkaid has:
• CV6
• 1 CA
• 1 CL 
• 8 DDs 
• 1 BB (SoDak)
• TF 17 under ADM George Murray has:
• CV8
• 2 CAs
• 2 CLs 
• 6 DDs

• Previous to CV6 returning from Pearl, CV8 was the only US CV in the area.
• CV8 was still, despite having been at Midway, an unexperienced CV.
• That being said, her aircrew was a mix of veterans and newbies.
• VS-8 skipper Gus Widhelm 
• Veteran of Coral Sea and hit and run raids with VS-5
• Fantastic leader
• VB-8 SBD pilot Clayton Fisher
• Veteran of the Flight to Nowhere, June 4 afternoon raid and Mogami/Mikuma raid on June 6, but otherwise relatively fresh

• CV6 had just returned to the fleet after having been patched up after Eastern Solomons
• CV6 still retained her well-trained deck crews, DC parties and the like.  Battle tested, CV6 would need all the help she could get in the upcoming fight
• While a veteran carrier, she deployed a brand-new air group, AG 10.
• Air Group 10, although new, is rife with veterans of different engagements
• VF-10, better known as the Grim Reapers, is led by the legendary Jimmy Flatley and hosts names like:
• Jack Leppla
• Don Flash Gordon
• Whitey Feightner and most importantly, 
• Swede Vejtasa
• Bucky Lee led VS-10, not so much a veteran, but an incredible leader.  He had with him names that were both familiar and would become familiar
• Birney Strong
• Martin “Red” Carmody
• Again, technically a new air group, Air Group 10 would prove to be, arguably, the finest Air Group put to sea in 1942, and maybe the war

The Battle draws near

• Night of October 24-25 the Japanese send out searches to find the suspected US CVs but do not find them.  They do detect ADM Willis Lee’s BB56 but do not attack due to extreme range
• Around noon on October 25 US PBYs spot 2 Japanese CVs
• Monitoring the radio intercepts in Noumea, Halsey reads the sightings and messages Kinkaid “STRIKE! REPEAT STRIKE!”
• Amplifying reports allowed Kinkaid to launch at 1430 and again at 1520 his main strike
• The Japanese turned north, but radio silence does not allow Kinkaid to recall his strikers. This ends up, not so well, in that the majority of the strike gets lost and is, thankfully, shepherded back to CV6 by Swede Vejtasa who recalls that CV6 has an oil leak, spots the leak and follows it, at wave-top height, back to CV6 with the majority of the strike…at night.

The Carrier Battle (Morning)

• Both sides readied search planes for a first light search pattern
• During the night of 25-26, US PBYs spotted, and attacked, the Japanese including Zuikaku.  The PBYs missed, and their contact reports essentially went unheard.
• The Japanese got scouts off first, between 0415 and 0445.
• CV6 launched her own scouts around 0445 as well.  
• Kinkaid finally received the PBYs sighting report at 0512 but deemed the information old (which it was) and considered it to be inaccurate.
• One of CV6s scouts saw and approached one of Nagumo’s Kate scout planes, only 85 miles away from CV6, confirming the presence of Japanese CVs in the area.

First Blood

• Bucky Lee, skipper of VS-10 spotted Nagumo’s CVs at 0650 and climbed to attack altitude, but were driven off by CAP
• Lee’s scouting report alerted every SBD in the area, and drove them towards the Japanese like flies to honey
• Radioman Clarence Garlow heard Lee’s report, jotted it down and reported the contact to his pilot, Birney Strong.
• Birney and Eastern Solomons, pressure from Crommelin to attack and a bruise on his pride
• Strong diligently plotted the contact report, adjusted his fuel mixture for maximum distance and headed in the direction of the sighting.
• Showing off his supreme navigational skills, Strong found the enemy 20 minutes later as 2 of the 3 CVs in the area emerged from cloud cover.
• At the same time that Strong and his wingman Irvine approached, 2 other SBDs, one piloted by Red Carmody were being harassed by CAP Zeros, leaving Strong and Irvine wide open for a clear attack.
• Diving from 14,000 feet, at 0740, Strong popped in and out of clouds for the 30 seconds he dove.  At 1,500 feet the clouds parted and directly beneath him was the flight deck of Zuiho.
• Both Strong and Irvine planted their 500 pounders into the flight deck of Zuiho. 
• The hits were not fatal, but did force her withdrawal.
• At 0658, Japanese scouts spot the Hornet
• Despite the fact that the US spotted the Japanese first, it is the IJN that gets their strike off first (no surprise here)
• At 0725 Shokaku and Zuikaku launches their strikes, 62 aircraft led by Murata
• Talk about Murata
• Composition of the strike
• As the Japanese strike is on its way to Hornet, CV8 and a small CV6 strike passes them in the air.
• Let’s talk about how the US strikes during this entire battle are very piecemeal, unorganized and generally unprepared
• As the Hornet strikers pass the Japanese, Zeros from Zuiho break off and attack the CV6 formation
• The TBFs are hit hard as their fighter protection was in the process of making S turns to keep up with the slow TBFs and were on the outward leg of the turn during the attack
• At 0850 Hornet’s strike spotted Shokaku.  As the SBDs home in, they are hit again by Zuiho CAP, as well as Shokaku CAP
• Gus Widhelm, strike leader, is shot down but later rescued.
• At the tail end of the formation is Clay Fisher
• Talk about Clay’s experience
• Hornet’s strike, despite taking heavy casualties, is successful in hitting Shokaku
• John describe Shokaku damage 4-06 hits from 1000 pounders

Hornet Under Attack

• Hornet receives word of the inbound strike from her outbound strike
• Poor coordination from CV6 and CV8 FDOs do not allow the CAP to engage in sufficient numbers to deter the incoming attack (Like Eastern Solomons)
• Japanese sight Hornet at 0855, but do not see CV6 as she dives into a rain squall
• Hornet prepares for the attack, turns NE and dials up 31 knots
• CAP engages at 15 miles but Vals break through and commence the attack at 0910
• First two Vals miss 
• At 0912 Hornet is hit by three bombs within minutes
• 1st bomb hits the flight deck and kills 60 men as it explodes 3 decks down
• Moments later another bomb struck the flight deck, this time exploding on the deck itself. The explosion blew an 11-foot hole in the deck, and the flying shrapnel killed another 30 of Hornet’s crew. Still the rain of bombs came. Hornet suffered yet another hit when another 550-pound bomb penetrated three decks below and exploded there, causing severe damage but no loss of life. Seconds later, a damaged “Val” dive-bomber, hit by Hornet’s own antiaircraft fire, plunged into the carrier’s stack, glancing off of the port leading edge of the stack and smacking into the flight deck, the engine and propeller embedded firmly into the sea-blue stained Douglas fir flight deck. 
• All of the hits suffered by Hornet thus far had occurred in a blinding fast span of just over two minutes. 
• As Hornet reels from the Val attack, the Kates come into view
• Describe the Kate attack led by Murata
• Hammer and anvil attack
• 0915 Hornet is struck by 2 torpedoes starboard
• 1 Val, having already dropped its load, swerves around Hornet from astern, passes the bridge and makes a wingtip vertical turn to crash into her port bow
• At 0925 the attack is over and Hornet is dead in the water and listing
• Fires were under control by 10, and she is being prepared for a two by Northampton

The Big E under attack

• Japanese Vals spot CV6 at 1000. They commence their attack at about 1015, led by Seki
• LT Keiichi Arima, who had hit the Big E at Eastern Solomons, again dives on CV6 and scores yet another hit on the ship.  Dead center near the bow.  The bomb flew through the flight deck and exploded in the water, showering CV6 with shrapnel and starting fires in the focsle
• Minutes later another bomb hits CV6, near the after portion of the forward elevator exploding in the hangar deck killing 40 men
• William Pinckney
• African American of slight build- carried wounded up the ladders to safety before he himself passed out, both wounded and with 3rd degree burns.  Navy Cross
• A third bomb was a tooth rattling near miss that opened hull plates and 2 empty fuel bunkers
• By 1020, the attack was over.
• At 1035 the Kates arrived.  One of the CAP pilots to engage was Swede Vejtasa
• During the attack on Hornet, Swede engaged and shot down one of the Vals that was about to dive on CV8, as well as one of the Vals that attacked CV6.
• Still aloft and with the majority of his ammunition still available, Swede switched off his two outboard weapons so as to conserve ammo, climbed above the Kate’s altitude, dove into them and began picking them off one by one, dropping five of the bandits in about 15 seconds.
• His last target, another Kate, was riddled by Swede’s guns, but flew on.  The aircraft piloted by Takei Kiyomi, dropped down, flew over SoDak and deliberately crashed into USS Smith.  The dead aircraft slid off the ship but the torpedo cooked off, setting the destroyer ablaze.
• Smith, under the command of LCDR Hunter Wood, steered directly into the boiling wake of SoDak.  The enormous wake thrown up by the battleship sliding along at 27 knots extinguished the flames, allowing the plucky little DD to resume station and resume firing.
• Vejtasa is credited with downing 7 Japanese aircraft in that one CAP mission, a record that still stands today. He would be recommended for the MOH, but instead would receive his 3rd (!) Navy Cross
• CV6 dodges a total of 9 Japanese torpedoes, throughout her ordeal USS South Dakota (BB-57) keeps station, a scant 1,000 yards astern, matching every move she makes so as to provide AAA support with her new 40mm bofors guns.
• SoDak claims 26 kills, an unlikely mark, but nevertheless, her guns and her adroit maneuvering certainly helped keep the Big E afloat.
• The returning Japanese (what few manage to return) get back to their CVs and speak of the tremendous amounts of American AA.  Some of those who returned were visibly shaken and could not speak due to shock.

The Battle Over

• At 1135 with CV8 out of action and CV6 heavily damaged, Kinkaid withdraws, leaving CV8 under tow by Northampton and a few screeners.
• At 1235 CV6 resumes landing ops and recovers the remaining aircraft aloft with only one operable elevator.  LSO Robin Lindsey, performs his legendary “virtuoso” 
• He receives word from the bridge to stop landing aircraft as the deck is clogged.  Knowing that the majority of the remaining aircraft are SBDs, he elects to literally pull the plug from his headset, ignore orders and bring the boys down.  
• Lindsey landed so many planes that he was landing the last batch on the last arresting wire, unfazed. 
• Last to land was Swede catching the #1 wire, with 56 other aircraft jammed ahead of him on the deck.
• At 1520, with the majority of US forces leaving the field of battle, Hornet is attacked again.  She is struck by 1 torpedo from Junyo. 
• At this point, the remaining crew abandons ship and she is ordered to be scuttled.
• 2 US DDs fire over 400 rounds into CV8 as well as torpedoes, but she refuses to sink.  (Harder than woodpecker lips)
• Knowing the IJN is closing, the DDs beat feet and get the hell out of the area, leaving CV8 to her enemy. 2 Japanese DDs finally finish Hornet off.

Implications on the Campaign

• Clearly Santa Cruz is a US defeat, although we claimed victory.  
• We leave the field of battle to the enemy and suffer more damage…clear defeat…in one way, a victory in another although unseen at that time.
• Japanese air losses have now reached a critical level.  Through attrition at Coral Sea, Midway, eastern Solomons, and especially Santa Cruz, more than half of the elite aviators who started the war are now dead.  
• Japanese pilot training and replacement systems problems
• Final Tally:
• US- 1 CV sunk, 1 DD sunk, 1 CV heavily damaged.  1 BB lightly damaged, 1 CL and 2 DDs damaged.
• 81 aircraft lost
• 266 men KIA
• Japanese- 1 CV heavily damaged, 1light CV damaged, 1 CA damaged, 1 DD damaged
• 99 aircraft lost
• 400-500 men KIA
• 18% of Zero pilots killed 
• 50% of Val crews killed
• 31% of Kate crews killed
• Horrendous aircrew losses
• US AA, with the introduction of the 40mm account for roughly half of these losses!