The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

John Basilone’s Hour of Glory-Henderson Field with special guest Dave Holland

Episode Summary

Today Seth and Bill are joined again by Dave Holland and the trio discusses the "high water mark" of the Japanese ashore on Guadalcanal-the October offensive that culminated in the Battle of Henderson Field. Tune in to see what the guys talk about as they break down this pivotal clash.

Episode Notes

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland.  Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert.  Welcome back, Dave.

We’ve been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese.  As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field.  The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson’s Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures.  

Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”.  All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation.  This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse. 

Talking Points:

Preparations:

• The Japanese had been steadily sending troops and supplies, more troops than supplies, to Guadalcanal for several weeks in anticipation of this specific offensive.

• The IJN fully supported the operation in just about any way that they could.

• On October 14, two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, along with screening vessels shelled Henderson Field in what was easily, the worst bombardment of the entire campaign.
• For nearly an hour and a half the two battleships fired over 900 rounds of 14 inch ammunition into the Lunga perimeter to knock out both airfields and destroy the Cactus Air Force’s aircraft.
• The shelling, known as “the Bombardment” by the Marines and soldiers ashore destroyed about half of the Cactus Air Force, and heavily damaged the two airfields, although one was back in operation in a few hours.
• This bombardment, as well as others in between, were all in conjunction with the large-scale offensive, all with plans to soften the defenses of the Americans.

• The Japanese had begun steadily moving troops into the attack area for many days, through the jungle (again), with the date of the main assault set for October 22, but would actually take place two days later.  

• To distract the Americans attention from the main location of the attack, the Japanese set up a series of diversionary infantry assaults.

• The Japanese were under the assumption that only 10,000 Americans were ashore, when in actuality the number was over 23,000.

• The Americans, aware that a large scale assault was eventually coming, had been preparing their defensive perimeter for weeks.
• The addition of the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment gave Vandegrift a total of 13 infantry battalions to defend the perimeter in an almost continuous line.

Prelude to the main event:

• The Japanese had been moving their main assault force through the jungle, along a trail blazed by their engineers, for days…completely undetected by American forces.

• At dusk on October 23, one of the diversion attacks under COL Nakaguma, alomng with 9 tanks, attacked Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matinikau river.

• The Japanese tanks advanced near the river under the cover of an artillery barrage, however, the Japanese tanks were either disabled or destroyed by Marine anti-tank weapons on the opposite side of the river.  

• In response to the Japanese assault, and the Japanese artillery, 4 battalions of Marine artillery fired over 6,000 rounds at the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties and essentially stopping the assault at the river.

• In between the artillery detonations, Marines on the line could audibly hear Japanese screaming and moaning in pain.  The artillery, yet again, was devastating.
• It should be mentioned that while this was happening, Vandegrift was in Noumea at the bidding of newly appointed head banana, Admiral Halsey.

• We’ll get to Haley’s installation as main man in another episode when we discuss the leadership, both good and bad, of the Guadalcanal campaign with buddy and friend of the show Jon Parshall. 

The Main Event October 24:

• At first light on October 24, Marines along the Matinikau caught sight of a long column of Japanese infantry  on a ridge to the left rear of the American lines.  
• COL Hanneken’s 2/7 redeployed to the rear and loosely tied in with the Marines of 3/7, albeit with a gap in the line.

• With the departure of Hanneken’s people, Chesty Puller was forced to stretch his single battalion over a regimental front.
• Only 700 men guarded an area designed for the protection from over 2,000.
• Puller, ever vigilant, personally walked the line inspecting each area, and each emplacement ordering improvements or movements as he saw fit in each area.

• As the Japanese under GEN Maruyama approached the area thought to be the correct position for attack, they began to get bogged down again by the jungle and now, also, heavy rain.
• The original kick off time for the attack, 1900, came and went as the Japanese continued to grope towards American lines.

• Finally, around 2200, elements of COL Shoji’s people stumbled into the leading elements of puller’s defenses.
• The fighting was short but fierce as Puller’s men eventually drove off the attackers, making no progress and gaining no ground.
• Oddly enough, the Japanese sent a message back to 2nd Division HQ that stated that Japanese infantry were moving into the grassy area at the edge of the airfield, when in reality, they were nowhere near the airfield and had certainly not broken through any lines.  

• COL Matsumoto called and stated that the airfield was now completely in Japanese hands. The 17th Army signaled “2300 Banzai-a little before 2300 the right wing captured the airfield.”

• This odd transmission is even stranger when one considers that the “right wing” had marginal, at best, participation in the event at all.

• Meanwhile, the left wing of the Japanese assault decidedly did attack.
• 3rd Battalion 29th Infantry 11th Company under CAPT Katsumata reconned American lines in the area, found a soft spot between 2 MG emplacements and began a low crawl advance towards the American gap in the lines that was threaded with barbed wire.

• Japanese engineers began snipping the wire, unbeknownst to Americans, as the infantry low crawled through the grass to spring a surprise assault.
• Either due to delirium from the long march, fear, excitement or a combination of all 3, one lone Japanese let out a war cry that was soon picked up by many others alerting the Americans of their presence.  

• Almost instantly American machine gun fire erupted as did mortars. The Japanese now knowing the surprise was gone, leapt up and charged.  They began to get entangled in the barbed wire and were summarily annihilated by the Marines holding that area, which was Puller’s A Company at about 0100.

• Shortly thereafter, Japanese of the 9th Company moved to the left in the wake of the now dead 11thCompany and prepared to attack.
• After giving a great Banzai, the men of the 9th Company charged Marine lines, running straight through the prepared machine gun position firing lanes of Puller’s C Company.

• Within 5 minutes, the 9th Company was wiped out.

• John Basilone

• After the majority of the infantry were killed, American artillery began dropping, killing what was left of the Japanese.

• Puller was now aware that he was under attack from a large and well-seasoned Japanese force. 
• He immediately fed 3 platoons from 3/164th into his lines to beef up the defenses.
• The National Guardsmen were led, sometimes by hand, through the torrential rain into the raging battle and fed piecemeal into the Marine lines, mixing with Marine units and holding their own in the fight.

• The only real success of the initial assaults came in the form of COL Furimaya’s assault at dawn. 
• Realizing he had little to work with, Furimaya assembled what he could and personally led an assault that partially pierced the American lines.
• About 100 Japanese broke through and held a salient in the Marine lines that was eradicated in the morning.

The Main Event October 25:

• By mid-morning, it was obvious that the Japanese were not through with their assault.  As a result, Marines and Army troops began to reshuffle their defenses and prepare for another night time assault.  
• For over an hour after 2000, the Japanese fired artillery into the positions of Puller’s 1/7 and LCOL Robert Hall’s 164th IR.  
• The majority of the assault fell on the soldiers of the 164th who held their ground again, all night long.  With the main push coming through an artery between the 2nd and 3rd BTLN 164th.  
• However, that artery was manned by a couple of Marine 37mm guns that were firing canister into the charging Japanese.
• A few Japanese parties broke the lines, but those were hunted down and killed by soldiers and Marines within hours.

• The return of Col Oka…
• His attacks concentrate on the area held by Hanneken’s 2/7
• Just before midnight, the Japanese surged forward against the Marine positions, finally culminating in an all out assault at 0300.
• Company F bore the brunt of this assault…
• Mitch Paige
• Despite Paige’s heroics, Japanese scaled the slopes in front of F Company and ejected them from their positions
• MAJ Odell Conoley led a group of Marines that counterattacked and eliminated the Japanese in the former positions of F Company.

The Battle Over:

• Rough US casualties run about 90 KIA

• Japanese casualties are unknown in exact figures but estimates range in the neighborhood of 2,200 but probably more than that.

• The Japanese blamed the terrain, the march through the jungle, no air support, poor physical condition of the troops, inadequate supplies, faulty intel, etc, etc…all of which were accurate.

• While this isn’t the last land battle on Guadalcanal, it certainly was the most crucial to the Japanese, and the most decisive for the Americans.  For all intents and purposes, the land campaign, in terms of Japanese all-out assaults and large-scale operations, was over.  While there were plans for yet another assault in November, as we shall see, this does not end well for the Japanese.