The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Sparring Along the Matinikau with special guest Dave Holland

Episode Summary

This week Seth and Bill are once again joined by Guadalcanal expert and friend Dave Holland. The trio breaks down some of the lesser-known, but still vitally important, clashes along the Matinikau River in September and October 1942. Tune in to see what the team learns and discusses along the way.

Episode Notes

This week we will be talking about the early actions that occurred along the Matinikau river.  Now, as opposed to the land battles we have discussed before, Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge which each only happened one time, the Matinikau actions occurred several times from September through November 1942.  Today, we will be focusing on the September and October actions.  

Following the battle at Edson’s Ridge, what remained of the Japanese force under General Kawaguchi, pulled back through the jungle and attempted to regroup, as well as refit, on the western side of the Matinikau river.  Marine general Archer Vandegrift was aware that the Japanese had done this very thing and planned to eliminate whatever was left of the force that had slammed against the ridge on two consecutive nights in September.

Vandegrift was determined to mop up what was left of the Japanese so as to deny them the opportunity to consolidate their forces and resume their offensive.  Vandegrift chose his freshest troops for this action, the recently arrived 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines under a Lieutenant Colonel whose name was and still is synonymous with the Corps.  Lewis B Chesty Puller.

Talking Points:

The 7th Marines Arrive:

• On September 18, the Marines on Guadalcanal finally received some much needed reinforcements, to the tune of 4157 men of the 7th Marine Regiment
• Fresh from garrison duty in Samoa, these Marines were both fresh and eager to go.
• Their arrival allowed Vandegrift to finally establish a full defensive perimeter around the Lunga Point area
• Learning from the lessons earlier in the campaign, the 7th Marines were disgorged on the beach early in the morning, and by 1800 that same day the cargo ships, now properly loaded, spit out a further 
• 137 trucks
• 4323 barrels of fuel
• 60% of the tentage and equipment needed by the 7th
• The remainder would be unloaded in short order

Lewis B “Chesty” Puller 

• 44 years old at this time
• Joined the Marines in 1918
• By 42 he had served 24 years in the Corps
• A veteran of Haiti, Nicaragua, better known as the banana wars, Puller had loads of combat experience before he ever got to the Canal
• Described as the prototypical Marine officer, Puller had a chin like “bulldozer blade”, a barrel chest and seemingly always had a pipe stuck in his teeth.  
• Highly decorated for service in Haiti and Nicaragua and grounded in the fundamentals of infantry combat and what it took to both be an infantryman, and how to survive as an infantryman, his men absolutely adored him.

Mission:

• Puller was to advance astride Mount Austen, cross the river and examine the area between Mount Austen and Kokumbona
• Clearly just an exploratory mission

• 900 men under Puller moved out on September 23
• On the afternoon of the next day, the lead elements of Puller’s force ran into a Japanese bivouac area on the NW slope of Mount Austen
• In the ensuing fight, the Marines drove the Japanese off just before dark, but took significant casualties
• 7 KIA 25 WIA

• The next day 2/5 was sent to reinforce Puller and allow his wounded to be brought to the rear

• At the same time, the Japanese had established a defensive area around the position known as “One Log Bridge” along the river
• The Japanese 12th Company, at the bridge, and Puller’s units hit each repeatedly with neither side gaining, or losing, any ground

• Because of the defense at one log bridge, Puller continued downstream, headed towards the mouth of the river and attempted a crossing.
• He was met with fierce Japanese defensive fire and mortars that handily checked the Marine advance and forced them to hold on the friendly side of the river

• Vandegrift sent the 1st Raiders to join Puller and at this point, Edson took command
• Edson and Puller devised a plan to have C Company of Puller’s Battalion move up the east side of the river, cross one log bridge and attack Matinikau village from the south
• 2/5 would hold the line near the mouth of the river to deny any attempt by the Japanese to flank Puller’s group

Attack:

• At first light on the 27th, the Raiders moved up to cross the one log bridge
• As they did so, they came under intense fire from well entrenched Japanese on the east bank of the river
• This was completely unexpected as far as the Marines were concerned
• Well placed Japanese mortar fire began to take effect on the Raiders
• Kenneth Bailey, leading the attack is killed here

• After Bailey is killed, LCOL Griffith, who had been wounded in the fight, tried to slip 2 companies around the entrenched Japanese in order to flank them, but they too were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire

• Back at the mouth of the river, the Japanese 9th Company continuously hurled back 2/5’s attacks across the river 

Pt Cruz:

• In an attempt to cut the Japanese off, Companies A, B and D of 1/7 landed near Point Cruz and began to push inland.
• It must be noted that the this action would not have occurred had it been known by Vandegrift that Puller’s and the Raider’s attack had not succeeded as yet.
• Garbled radio transmissions from Griffith did not make it clear that the action was successful
•  
• Almost immediately, the Marines came under heavy fire as COL Oka deployed several units to attack the recently landed Marines
• Mortar rounds killed Major Rogers, and wounded another Company commander, leaving Captain Charles Kelly to assume command of the operation
• Within a short amount of time, the Japanese had moved behind the marines (coast side) and cut them off from any route of escape
• Realizing their predicament, Kelly ordered to radio for help…but no radios had been brought to the area by the Marines.
• Using t-shirts, the Marines spelled out HELP on the ground, a signal that was seen by an SBD pilot from VMSB231 named Dale Leslie.
• Leslie relayed the Marines’ desperate message which was picked up by Puller
• Meanwhile, Edson’s attack was still underway when he too received the message of distress from Kelly.
• Edson halted his attack despite Puller’s heated argument that halting the attack would allow the Japanese to send more men to attack and eventually annihilate Kelly.

• Fearing for his men, Puller hauled ass back to Kukum where he boarded the destroyer USS Monssen 
• Gathering landing craft, Puller, Monssen, and a flock of 10 landing craft headed towards Point Cruz in the area the Marines had initially landed
• Once arriving, the landing craft were greeted by furious fire from the Japanese who had by this time, pushed the Marines back, cut them off and were preparing to mount an assault to destroy them
• Puller was able to establish comms with Kelly ashore by use of semaphore and directed him to make his way to the coast NOW
• As the Marines attempted to fight their way out, the destroyer Monssen provided direct artillery support with every available weapon aboard ship for 30 minutes and helped blast a path for the withdrawing Marines
• By 1630, those who could, had made it to the beach as the landing craft were heading to rescue them
• Realizing the Marines were trying to escape, the Japanese poured fire into them and tried to reestablish the encirclement

Douglas Munro

• Munro ordered his Higgins landing craft towards the shore as he and the other boats in his formation came under intense fire.
• Manning a Lewis machine gun, Munro returned fire at the Japanese and ordered for his boat to move closer to the beach so as to shield the Marines that were attempting to embark on the other landing craft.
• As his boat moved into position, Munro noticed a grounded landing craft, again moving his boat to shield the Marines attempting to free the craft, Munro purposely exposed himself and his boat to withering enemy fire.  
• Holding station for several minutes, Munro poured fire back at the Japanese and eventually directed his boat to withdraw after the previously grounded landing craft had been freed and loaded with Marines.  As Munro’s craft withdrew he was struck by a Japanese bullet at the base of his skull.
• Rushing back to Lunga point, his best friend Raymond Evans cradled Munro in his arms. Munro regained consciousness, looked at Evans and asked, “Did they get off?” Evans replied in the affirmative, and Munro died.
• Munro was the first, and so far, the only Coast Guardsman to receive the MOH
• The ill-fated Marine action resulted in 70 KIA and a further 100 WIA

October 6-9 actions

• On October 3 LTGEN Maruyama was landed along with fresh troops.  His mission was to set up artillery positions on the opposite side of the Matinkiau with which to shell Marine positions in preparation for the late October offensive that was on the horizon
• Over the next few days, the Japanese proceeded to do just that as well as set up further defensive postions along the banks of the river.

• Vandegrift, again aware that the Japanese were preparing positions as well as preparing for an offensive

• Daily Marine patrols ran into Japanese and confirmed both the arrival of fresh troops and the preparations for offensive

• As a result of this knowledge, Vandegrift once again planned an offensive against the Matinikau positions to eliminate the threat before it came to him
• His plan was to strike and seize the area near Kokumbona to deny Japanese access to the trails that lead to the upper portion of the Lunga area.
• The 5th Marines, minus 1/5 would advance along the coast and force a crossing of the river.
• The Whaling Group, as well as the 7th Marines, would cross the river further south at one log bridge.
• Once across the Whaling Group and the 7th would attack down the ridges and hopefully trap a large number of Japanese in the process.

The fighting:

• October 7 the attack kicked off, with 3/5 reaching the river and running into fierce resistance
• 3/5 used 75mm artillery pieces mounted in half-tracks to pour direct fire into the Japanese positions.  Slowly, the Japanese gave ground.
• By nightfall, the Marines held the mouth of the river and the Whaling Group and the 7th had crossed the river easily at one log bridge

• The following afternoon, H Company 5th Marines under Captain Rigaud mistakenly entered a valley between two Japanese units

• The enemy holding the high ground poured fire into H Company.  Marines started to panic, and began to run.  Rigaud stood up in the middle of the fight, challenged his men, shamed them, cajoled them and made them retake their positions and eventually withdrew in order.
• Fighting died down on the 7th and the assault waited until the following day to complete the encirclement
• On the 8th, Vandegrift received intel that the Japanese were preparing an all out offensive to recapture the island.  As a result, he cancelled the operation for the next day and ordered his units to return to the American perimeter to prepare a defense following this day’s actions. 
• The Whaling Group and 2/7 reached the beach as Puller’s group topped a ridgeline to find an entire Japanese battalion in the ravine below him.
• Puller called in artillery and mortars and watched as the artillery did its work, calling them machines for extermination.
• The Japanese tried to escape by climbing up the ravine side and were taken under direct machine gun and rifle fire from Puller’s men.
• Only after Puller’s men had expended all of their mortar ammunition did he order cease fire, moving out to rejoin Whaling and Hanneken ahead of him.
• This concluded the second battle around the Matinikau which resulted in:
• 65 KIA and 125 WIA
• The Japanese lost around 700 men in the three day engagement

Effects on the campaign:

Because of the loss of the Matinikau, the Japanese were forced to eventually march their men through the jungle (again) before the major assault around Henderson Field in late October .  This march, like Kawaguchi’s the month before, exhausted the attackers to the point where their efficiency in the attack that came was severely diminished.